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Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080010-1

27 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense
24 June 1977


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3. We discussed paramilitary operations and agreed to look at it again after some reflection.

a. A first issue is whether the United States needs a covert paramilitary capability for direct action, e.g., capturing a nuclear weapon held by terrorists and rescuing American citizens. If we do need a covert direct action paramilitary capability, it presumably should be in the CIA.

Surprise "Quick Strike" Sweep b. The second question is whether we need a CIA ~~secret~~ direct action paramilitary capability, e.g., a rescue operation or terrorist bomb operation in which for some reason it would be difficult for the military to get in in secrecy but in which we would not be ashamed or unwilling if after the action was successfully completed ~~it was not held covert~~. *TO Acknowledge that we have done it*

c. What level of covert paramilitary training and supply assistance does the country require, e.g., providing arms and training in their use to  guerrillas?

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d. What is the trade-off here between the army special forces having this capability and the CIA?

(1) For instance, what is the particular value of the CIA's being able to provide weapons which could not be attributed to the United States? If that is going to be the case, would it be a major operation such as

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4. I left the point paper on CIA position regarding whether the Soviets are more concerned with the B-1 or the cruise missile.

a. I left the point paper on our evaluation of the SS-19 CEP. I note that DDI did not answer paragraph 3a of my question from the conversation with Secretary Brown on 17 June; that is, how does the kill probability of the SS-19 compare with the Minuteman III with a Mark 12A warhead? Request that be answered.

5. I discussed additional major intelligence categories. No conclusion. Secretary Brown indicated he had just turned in his list of intelligence priorities.

6. I briefed Secretary Brown on my briefing to the Joint Economic Committee on the Soviet economy and left him copies of it.

7. I briefed Secretary Brown on my briefing to the President on cryptanalysis. It turned out that he had given virtually the same briefing to the President last Tuesday.

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STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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